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BLOOD AS A BIOLOGICAL "DRUG":
SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN THE
REGULATION OF PLACENTAL AND UMBILICAL CORD
STEM CELL TRANSPLANTATION
Jennifer Kulynych*
In Southern California, this is already spreading like crazyit's becoming cocktail party conversation.'
[Wiell-intentioned people cry out against a proposal they do
not fully understand .... '
There are a lot of people out there doing bad things, it's
scary ....

I. INTRODUCTION
Not all blood cells are created equal. Some are born, carry
out their appointed tasks-red blood cells oxygenating the
blood, white blood cells fighting infection-and die. But an elusive subset have special properties: they are the progenitors of
all the many types of peripheral (circulatory) blood cells, and as
such, they have the potential to reconstitute an entire blood
supply.4 Known as hematopoietic stem cells, these blood cells

* B.A., 1983, University of Virginia; MA, 1989, Ph.D., 1994, The American
University; J.D., 1998, Stanford University. Law Clerk to the Honorable Sam Ervin,
Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (1998-99 Term).
1. Tim Cady of the Cord Blood Registry, quoted in Shari Roan, From a New Life
Can Come the Chance to Save Another, L-A TZIES, May 1, 1996, at El, E2.
2. Letter from Pablo Rubenstein, M.D., New York Blood Center, to the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) 3 (July 12, 1996) (on file with the FDA).
3. Hal Broxmeyer, Indiana University School of Medicine, quoted in Susan Cohen, Tangle Lifeline: The Cord Blood in a Newborn's Placenta Looks to Researchers
Like a Fountainheadof New Lifesaving Therapies, WASH. POST MAG., Aug. 18, 1996,
at 10, 28.
4. See Leslie E. Silberstein & Leigh C. Jefferies, Placental Blood Banking-A
New Frontier in Transfusion Medicine, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 199, 200 (1996).
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reproduce indefinitely. For patients with leukemia or other
blood diseases, the transplantation of hematopoietic stem cells
from another person's bone marrow can provide the gift of life.5
Unfortunately, harvesting and transplanting bone marrow
stem cells is costly and painful for both donor and recipient.
Bone marrow transplantation is further complicated by the fact
that donor and recipient must be closely matched on a range of
immunological factors.6 The cost (expenses can exceed
$250,000), pain, and difficult logistics of bone marrow transplantation result in an estimated 50,000 patients per year failing to receive needed transplants.7
In 1988, however, a medical breakthrough occurred. Researchers successfully exploited a new source of hematopoietic
stem cells when "cord blood"---blood harvested at birth from human placentas and umbilical cords-was used in France to
repopulate the blood supply of a child with a rare, lethal form
of anemia.8 Interest in cord blood transplantation was immediate, because the new technique appeared to have several advantages over bone marrow transplantation: cord blood was readily
available, painless to obtain, and a particularly rich source of
blood-producing stem cells.9 Even better, the relative immaturity of cord blood stem cells offered the possibility that transplant recipients and donors might not need to be so closely
matched for immunological factors, thus greatly expanding the
range of patients who might benefit from transplantation.0
As the scientific investigation of cord blood progressed, enthusiastic researchers soon came into contact with venture capitalists, and a new form of biotech entrepreneurship was born: the

5. See id.
6. These immunological factors are known as HLA antigens. See discussion infra
Part II.A.
7. See Ron Winslow, Placenta May Be Source of Cells Vital in Bone Marrow
Transplants, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1992, at B6.
8. See E. Gluckman et al., Hematopoietic Reconstitution in a Patient with
Fanconi's Anemia by Means of Umbilical-Cord Blood from an HLA-Identical Sibling,
321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1174, 1174 (1989).
9. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 11-12.
10. See Silberstein & Jefferies, supra note 4, at 199; see generally Hal Broxmeyer,
Questions to be Answered Regarding Umbilical Cord Blood Hematopoietic Stem and
Progenitor Cells and Their Use in Transplantation,35 TRANSFUSION 694 (1995).
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for-profit cord blood bank." The target market for commercial
cord blood services was vast, potentially including every expectant parent in the United States. With amazing rapidity, what
has been termed a "biological gold rush" had begun. 2
From the date of the first successful transplant in 1988, cord
blood studies have yielded promising results in the treatment of
childhood leukemia and hereditary blood and. immune diseases.' 3 However, manipulative cord blood marketing techniques
and some researchers' safety concerns soon prompted complaints to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In response, the FDA has proposed to enter the cord blood field as a
regulator."' After holding workshops on the issue, the FDA released a draft document outlining a possible regulatory approach to cord blood transplantation; 5 this tentative step generated heated controversy among scientists and among participants in the private cord blood banking industry. A campaign
of newspaper editorials and letters to congressmen ensued,
many written by panicked parents who were convinced that
FDA regulation would16 destroy the seemingly magical potential
of cord blood banking.

Inevitably, public outcry and industry lobbying brought political scrutiny to the regulatory process, and cord blood transplantation became a set piece in the FDA regulatory reform cam-

11. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 14-15.
12. See id. at 13 ("There is already competition in the delivery suite, like a rush

for biological gold.").
13. See Silberstein & Jefferies, supra note 4, at 200.
14. Telephone Interview with Liana Harvath, Ph.D., Chief, Lab of Cellular Hematology, FDA (Dec. 2, 1996); see also Letter from Diane E. Thompson, Associate FDA
Commissioner for Legislative Affairs, to the Honorable Robert E. Andrews, United
States House of Representatives 1 (July 31, 1996) (on file with the FDA).
15. See CENTER FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, DRAFT DOCUMENT CONCERNING THE REGULATION OF PLACENTAL/UMBILICAL CORD BLOOD STEM CELL PRODUCTS INTENDED FOR TRANSPLANTATION
OR FURTHER MANUFACTURE INTO INJECTABLE PRODUCTS (FDA Docket No. 96N-0002),
Feb. 26, 1996 [hereinafter CORD BLOOD DRAFT DOCUMENT].
16. See, e.g., Linda DeSpain, The FDA Snuffs a Ray of Hope, WALL ST. J., June
18, 1996, at A22; Parents Fear Blood Bank Rules: FDA Blames Cord-Blood Panic on
'Misinformation' by Banks, RICH. TIMS-DISPATCH, June 16, 1996, at A2 (hereinafter
Parents Fear Rules].
The FDA has 16 volumes of cord blood public commentary on file and available
for public inspection at the Documents Management Branch (HFA-305), Food and
Drug Administration, Rm. 1-23, 12420 Parklawn Dr., Rockville, Maryland 20857.
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paign that swept through the 104th Congress. 7 Senator Ron
Wyden (D-Oregon) introduced the Human Tissue Safety Act of
1996,18 a bill that would, inter alia, specifically exempt cord
blood from most aspects of the FDA's regulatory oversight. 9
The 1996 Tissue Act failed to emerge from committee, but because FDA reform remains high on the agenda of the new Congress, similar provisions regarding cord blood may be incorporated into FDA reform legislation in the 105th Congress. Meanwhile, in February of 1997, the FDA issued a comprehensive
draft proposal for the regulation of all human tissue, with provisions specific to cord blood stem cells.2" These provisions
modify the FDA's earlier, more cautious approach to cord blood
regulation.
This article will examine the controversy over cord blood
regulation. Part II provides background information on cord
blood transplantation and describes the two regulatory approaches that the FDA has proposed to date. Part III surveys
unresolved scientific questions about cord blood transplantation,
while Part IV examines policy arguments for and against cord
blood regulation and explores the difficult questions of property
law that arise when cord blood is treated as a marketable commodity. Part V describes the Tissue Act and its intended consequences. The article concludes that the Tissue Act is a conceptually flawed solution to the cord blood controversy, and further, that as a result of the passage of this or a similar bill,
careful consideration of the many unresolved ethical and scientific issues involved in cord blood transplantation would be
cut short by a legislative fiat. Rather than capitulating to political and industry pressure and adopting weakened regulatory
requirements, the FDA should proceed with its original, scien-

17. See Charles A. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort
Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. REV 883, 886 (1996) (discussing FDA as a target of regulatory reform).
18. S. 2195, 104th Cong. (1996).
19. See id.
20. See CENTER FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, PROPOSED APPROACH TO REGULATION OF CELLULAR AND TISSUEBASED PRODUCTS (FDA Docket No. 97N-0068), Feb. 28, 1997 [hereinafter CELLULAR &
TISSUE-BASED PRODUCTS].
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tifically sound proposal to treat cord blood as an investigatory
new drug subject to a period of clinical development.

II. CORD BLOOD TRANSPLANTATION: A PRIMER
A. A Brief History of Stem Cell Transplantation
The harvesting of bone marrow stem cells for allogenic (one
person to another) transplantation began in the 1960s and soon
became an important medical intervention.2 1 The typical bone
marrow transplant recipient is a leukemia victim, but bone
marrow transplantation (BMT) is also used to treat other disorders, particularly anemias and immune system dysfunction.
Most recently, BMT has been used in the experimental treatment of organ and inoperative metastatic cancers.22
As an alternative to BMT, researchers can now harvest hematopoietic stem cells from a patient's own peripheral (circulatory) blood. This stem cell collection technique is most often
used prior to cancer therapy, when stem cells are harvested
from a patient's blood and then reintroduced after treatment, in
anticipation that the patient's bone marrow will be unavoidably
damaged by high-dose chemotherapy and radiation.' Peripheral stem cells are harvested in a process called apheresis, in
which blood is circulated through a machine that removes the
cells from the patient's bloodstream. Apheresis requires two to
four hours per session, and the extraction process must be
repeated an average of six times to obtain a sufficient concentration of stem cells for transplantation.'

21. See NATIONAL CANCER INSTrTUTE, RESEARCH REPORT: BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION AND PERIPHERAL BLOOD STEM CELL TRANSPLANTATION (NIH Publication
No. 95-1178), Nov. 1994 [hereinafter NCI REPORT]. The NCI REPORT is available
online at <http'J/cancernet.nci.nih.gov>. The page numbers cited in this article will
refer to the online version of the NCI REPORT.
22. See id at 3.
23. See id. Chemotherapy and radiation target cells that are dividing, thus, these
treatments destroy both cancer cells and bone marrow stem cells. Destruction of the
bone marrow cells may be a deliberate component of treatment for leukemia and
related blood disorders, or simply an inadvertent consequence of radiation and chemotherapy for other disorders. See id.
24. See id. at 7.
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Both BMT and peripheral blood stem cell transplantation
involve significant cost and donor inconvenience. Both techniques also require a high degree of histocompatibility between
donor and recipient. 25 To maximize the possibility of a successful transplant, surgeons usually require a match between donor
and recipient on five of six human leukocyte-associated antigens
(HLAs), which are proteins found on the surface of cells.26
The ideal stem cell donor is a sibling who shares the same
HLA genotype as the patient, but such matches occur less than
30% of the time. With a current demographic trend toward
smaller family sizes, the likelihood of finding HLA-identical
siblings will continue to decrease.2
Unrelated donors who
match with the patient on a sufficient number of HLA antigens
are also quite difficult to find, especially when patients belong
to racial and ethnic minorities whose numbers are
underrepresented in computerized donor registries.' Due to
the difficulty of finding a matched source of donor stem cells,
thousands of leukemia victims and other patients die each year
prior to obtaining a transplant.
In a stem cell transplant, a patient's damaged blood production system is purposely (or inadvertently, as a result of treatment for some cancers) destroyed by chemotherapy and radiation. The donor's hematopoietic stem cells are then introduced

25. See Dr. Richard Champlin, M.D., Chairman of the Department of Hematology,
Anderson Cancer Center, Remarks at the Peripheral Blood Stem Cell Workshop 24
(FDA Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Feb. 22, 1996) [hereinafter Peripheral Blood Workshop]. The transcript of the workshop is available at the Documents Management Branch of the FDA. See supra note 16.
26. See NCI REPORT, supra note 21, at 4.
27. See Dr. John Hansen, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, Remarks at
the Workshop on Cord Blood Stem Cells: Discussion of Procedures for Transplantation
and Storage 75 (FDA Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Dec. 13, 1995)
[hereinafter Cord Blood Workshop]. The transcript of the workshop is available at the
Documents Management Branch of the FDA. See supra note 16.
28. See Silberstein & Jefferies, supra note 4, at 206.
29. See NCI REPORT, supra note 21, at 4. It is important to note, however, that
BMT does not invariably result in a cure. Many transplant patients die every year in
spite of BMT, due to transplant failure or relapse, or, in some cases, because of BMT,
if they experience graft versus host disease or other transplant-related complications.
For a discussion of transplant-related complications, see generally Cord Blood Workshop, supra note 27.
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into the patient's blood stream in an attempt to repopulate the
patient's blood supply with new cells.3"
Successful repopulation or engraftment, in which the transplanted stem cells migrate to the patient's bone marrow and
begin to produce new blood cells, often fails to occur."' Even
when engraftment is achieved, in many cases the patient's body
is then assailed by the donor's foreign cells in a reaction known
as graft-versus-host disease (GVHD)."2 This disease is related
to the degree of histocompatibility between donor and recipient
and occurs when infection-fighting cells in the donated marrow
attack the transplant recipient's body.3 GVHD can occur immediately or years after the transplant procedure, and severe
cases of GVHD are often fatal. Some researchers think that
paradoxically, mild cases may actually protect the transplant
patient against relapse, if the activated donor cells also kill
residual cancer cells in the recipient's body (termed the graftversus-cancer effect). 4
The past decade witnessed the introduction of a new and
exciting alternative to conventional sources of hematopoietic
stem cells: blood drawn at birth from the umbilical cord or the
placenta. This so-called "cord" blood is simple to obtain, and it
turns out to be rich in hematopoietic stem cells. The potential
value of placental and umbilical cord blood, which has long
been considered medical waste,35 was first recognized in 1988
by two scientists, cancer researcher Edward Boyse and hematologist Hal Broxmeyer." Together, Boyse and Broxmeyer engineered the first transplant of cord blood stem cells between a
young patient with the rare blood disease Fanconi's anemia and
an unaffected sibling." Since that groundbreaking 1988 procedure, over 200 allogenic cord blood stem cell transplants have
been performed, and the initial rates of survival and GVHD
incidence compare favorably to statistics for BMT.3"
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

NCI Report, supra note 21, at 5.
id. at 8.
id. at 10.
id.
id. at 10-11.
Roni Rabin, Bloodline, NEWSDAY, Apr. 9, 1996, at B19.
Cohen, supra note 3, at 13.
id. at 13-14.
Jean-Philippe Laporte et al., Cord Blood Transplantation from an Unre-
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The ultimate promise of cord blood stem cell transplantation
may some day be realized through gene therapy. If researchers
eventually succeed in causing cord blood stem cells to take up
new genes, the rapidly-dividing stem cells could then produce
legions of genetically-altered progeny within the transplant
recipient's body.39 Researchers hope that these manipulated
stem cells could be used to replace or alter the function of
genes known to be defective in a growing list of diseases. Clinical breakthroughs in gene therapy have been slow to arrive,
however, the use of stem cells to cure genetically-transmitted
diseases remains only a theoretical possibility.4 °
Nonetheless, the immediate clinical utility of cord blood was
such that in 1992, the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute (NHLBI) of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) decided
to fund a pilot cord blood bank at the New York Blood Center.4 This study provided the initial evidence that cord blood
could feasibly be harvested, stored and transplanted between
unrelated child donors and recipients. In an expanded thirty
million dollar project,42 NHLBI will now establish a network of
public cord blood banks under a research protocol addressing
optimal methods of cord blood collection and storage.43 Researchers in the NHLBI study will also examine whether cord
blood transplantation might be a successful treatment for adult

lated Donor in an Adult with Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED.
167, 167 (1996).
39. See Joan Stephenson, Terms of Engraftment: Umbilical Cord Blood Transplants Arouse Enthusiasm, 274 JAMA 1813, 1814 (1995).
40. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ASSESSING GENETIC
RISKS, IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 150 (1995) [hereinafter ASSESSING GENETIC RIS)S]. One cord blood transfusion involving gene therapy was attempted in 1995. In that case, stem cells carrying the gene for the enzyme adenosine
deaminase (ADA) were transplanted into three children with ADA deficiency. Longitudinal data are needed to determine the success or failure of this experiment. See
generally D.B. Kohn, Gene Therapy for Hematopoietic and Immune Disorders, 18 BONE
MARROW TRANSPLANTATION 55, 55-58 (1996); T. Moritz et al., Human Cord Blood
Cells as Targets for Gene Transfer: Potential Use in Genetic Therapies of Severe Combined Immunodeficiency Disease, 178 J. ExP. MED 529 (1993).
41. See Letter from Claude Lenfant, Director, NHLBI, to the FDA 1 (July 25,
1996) (on file with the FDA).
42. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 13.
43. See id.; see also Letter from Lenfant, supra note 41, at 1-2.
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patients, or for patients whose HLA antigen-type does not closely match that of the cord blood donor."
B. The Cord Blood Controversy
Cord blood banking became controversial as a result of a
growing phenomenon in American science: the entry of venture
capital at an early phase in the development of a scientific
field, through profit-oriented collaborations between academic
scientists and biotechnology entrepreneurs.4 5 Changes in federal law have created economic incentive for such collaboration,
thus speeding the commercial application of new research discoveries.4"
The commercialization of cord blood happened relatively
quickly. Following the success of the first cord blood transplant,
Broxmeyer, Boyse, and several other researchers patented their
technique, sought venture capital, and founded Biocyte Corp.,
the original for-profit cord blood bank.47 Since the field of cord
blood banking was unregulated, barriers to entry were low, and
other private ventures soon followed. When concerns about the
marketing and storage practices of the for-profits (and, in some
cases, of the nonprofit cord blood storage centers") came to
the attention of the FDA, the agency formed a task force with
representatives from all interested parties, and eventually put
forth the first of two draft proposals for a regulatory strategy.
C. FDA's Draft Proposals for Cord Blood Regulation
The central and most controversial aspect of the FDA's initial
draft approach was a proposal to treat cord blood cells similarly

44. See Letter from Lenfant, supra note 41, at 1-2.
45. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 15.
46. See generally Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr. & Suzanne M. Bonnet, Technology
Transfer: Trends in the Federalization of Biomedical Research, 71 ACAD. MED. 709
(1996).
47. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 14-15.
48. One concern with the New York Blood Center trial was the practice of not
retaining donor identity for potential follow-up. By current consensus, it is now generally agreed that donor identities must be retained with cord blood specimens. See
Jeffery McCullough et al., Proposed Policies and Proceduresfor the Establishment of a
Cord Blood Bank, 20 BLoOD CELLS 609, 614 (1994).
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to experimental new drugs, by imposing the rules that govern
the Investigational New Drug (IND) process.4 9 IND regulations
prohibit the marketing and commercialization of a new drug
until sufficient data exists to develop licensing, labeling, and
manufacturing standards." In February, 1996, the FDA suggested that only when the IND period of clinical development
was complete would cord blood banks be permitted to apply for
various licenses that permit the commercial production of
biologics. 5 Until such time, all cord blood banking and
transplantation would be conducted on a nonprofit basis, under
FDA-approved research protocols.5 2
In a February 1997 modification of this initial proposal, the
FDA suggested that the agency would exempt the storage and
transplantation of autologous cord blood samples, and samples
intended for use in a first degree blood relative, from IND regulations and associated premarket approval restrictions." Entities, public or private, that did not store cord blood for the
purpose of allogenic transplant would only be required to comply with FDA-established standards and procedures for the
handling and storage of cord blood specimens.' This latter
proposal, while partially preserving a period of clinical development, would also allow significant commercialization of cord
blood storage in the face of many unanswered questions about
the safety, efficacy, and ethics of cord blood transplantation.55
Arguably, the FDA has the discretion to dispense with
premarket approval requirements altogether. Should the agency
conclude that the commercial and the clinical (non-research) use
of cord blood is appropriate at this time, the FDA could simply
designate cord blood as a well-characterized biologic, and deem
the transplantation of cord blood specimens to fall within the
traditionally unregulated "practice of medicine." The agency
could then adopt and enforce the processes and standards pro-

49.
50.
SUMER,
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See CORD BLOOD DRAFT DOCUMENT, supra note 15.
See John A- Norris, Fulfilling FDA's Vision of Faster Drug Review, FDA CONJan. 1988, at 7, 7.
See CORD BLOOD DRAFr DOCUMENT, supra note 15.
See id.
See CELLULAR & TISSUE-BASED PRODUCTS, supra note 20.
See id.
See discussion infra Parts ILE, III.
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posed by the cord blood industry," without subjecting cord
7
blood to exacting requirements of efficacy and potency. Opponents of IND regulations for cord blood regard the FDA as the
source of costly and unnecessary delays caused by the imposition of a complicated regulatory framework for new medical
products. 5
D. Current Food and Drug Regulatory Schemes
Statutory authorities extend the regulatory reach of the FDA
broadly to encompass the oversight of one trillion dollars worth
of drugs and consumer products per year.59 In a 1996 speech,
FDA Commissioner Kessler described his agency as "the most
important consumer protection agency in the world," while at
the same time he acknowledged tension between the agency's
regulatory function and an equally critical mission, that of
"getting new therapies to people who need them.""0 To this
latter end, the FDA has always maintained that it "treads
lightly" upon the practice of medicine and surgery.6 ' Agency
officials have expressed the desire to collaborate with industry,
academia, and the medical community in a cooperative approach to establishing regulatory oversight for new products.62
Currently, the FDA is confronting significant deregulatory pressures from Congress and from powerful industry groups," such
that the final outcome of new regulatory proposals may ultimately be shaped as much by political forces as by scientific
considerations.'
56. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Moore, President, Cord Blood Registry, to the
FDA (July 26, 1996) (suggesting that the Foundation for the Accreditation of Hematopoietic Cell Therapy should work with industry and medical groups to establish
quality assurance and registration standards for cord blood transplantation).

57. See Edward L. Korwek, Human Biological Drug Regulation: Past, Present, and
Beyond the Year 2000, FOOD & DRUG L.J., 50th Anniversary Issue, Spring 1995, at
123, 129.
58. See generally Public Comments submitted to the FDA, supra note 16.
59. See The Food and Drug Administration: An Overview (visited March 30, 1998)
<http-/www.fda.gov>.
60. David Kessler, FDA Commissioner, Address to the Food and Drug Law Institute, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 19, 1996).
61. See id.
62. See Philip D. Noguchi, From Jim to Gene and Beyond: An Odyssey of
Biologics Regulation, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 367, 373 (1996).
63. See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 17, at 887.
64. See discussion infra Parts IV, V (discussing policy considerations of cord blood
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The FDA's regulation of new drugs and medical therapies is
complex, and at times, unwieldy.65 The regulation of biological
products in particular has been forced to evolve in response to
rapid advances in pharmaceutical research and biotechnology.
The following discussion will summarize the FDA's current
regulatory framework for drugs and other medical products and
will highlight some of the definitional and jurisdictional issues
that the FDA has faced in overseeing the use of human blood
and blood components.
For the purposes of regulation, the FDA divides the universe
of medical products into three categories: (1) drugs; (2) medical
devices; and (3) biologics." The definitional boundaries of these
categories are expansive and overlapping. For example, under
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FFDCA) and related amendments,67 a drug is defined as any product "intended
for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals."' Reviewing courts
have granted the FDA great discretion to fashion its own interpretation of the statutory language governing the classification
of products, under the rationale that broad agency discretion is
consistent with FDA's responsibility to protect the public
health.69

regulation and specifically the Tissue Act and its consequences).
65. See John C. Petricciani, Reinventing the Biologics Approval Process, 51 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 139, 140 (1996) (stating that current system of product jurisdiction "is
neither logical nor efficient").
66. See Section 201(g)(1) of the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.
321(g)(1) (1994) (defining "drugs"); Section 201(h) of the Federal Food Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 321(h) (1994) (defining "device"); Section 351(a) of the Public
health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 262(a) (1994) (defining "biological product"). It should be
noted that some complex products are combined drugs, devices, and/or biologics. For
example, cigarettes are considered a device for the delivery of the drug nicotine. Similarly, gene therapy utilizes biological products that are both therapeutic drugs and
the delivery devices. See generally Cohen, supra note 3.
Under the FDA's interpretation of the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, 21
U.S.C. §§ 321, 333, 351, 353, 360(c)-(j), 360(1), 360(hh)-(ss), 383; 42 U.S.C. § 263(b)-(n)
(1994), the agency has discretion to determine the primary mode of action for a product and to select the most appropriate regulatory classification. See Prohibition of
Sale and Distribution to Persons Younger Than 18 Years of Age, 21 C.F.R. §§ 897.10,
897.12, 897.14, 897.16 (1997) [hereinafter FDA Tobacco Regulations].
67. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95 (1994).
68. Id. § 321(g)(1).
69. See, e.g., United States v. An Article of Drug... Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S.
784, 800 (1969) (noting that the FDA may interpret the meaning of the term "drug"
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1. Drugs
New drugs must receive FDA approval prior to marketing.
Through the premarket approval process, the FDA requires
that, before advertising a drug or selling it for a profit, a sponsor must demonstrate that the drug is both safe and effective
for its intended uses.7 °
The approval process begins when a drug's sponsor, after
having collected sufficient data about the effects (therapeutic
and toxic) of the drug in laboratory animals, applies to the FDA
for an investigatory new drug exemption (IND).7 Since the
FFDCA prohibits the distribution of drugs that have not yet
been approved by the FDA, the agency must grant investigators
an exemption from the statute to permit the use of an unapproved drug in research with human subjects.72
If the FDA grants the IND exemption, the sponsor may begin
the first of three phases of clinical (human) trials.73 Phase 1
trials are small-scale studies conducted with healthy volunteers,
largely for the purpose of determining a drug's short-term side
effects and toxicity.74 If levels of risk appear acceptable, Phase
II testing will be authorized in a larger sample of patients,
usually several hundred individuals. Phase II testing normally
involves randomized controlled trials to investigate whether the
drug is effective for its intended use.75 The timeline to completion of Phase II testing is normally two to three years from
approval of the IND.7"
If data from Phases I and II suggest that the drug is both
safe and effective, the FDA will authorize Phase III testing, in
which researchers administer the new drug to an even broader

broadly, consistent with the agency's mission to protect public health); see also FDA
Tobacco Regulations, supra note 66.
70. See, e.g., FDA Tobacco Regulations, supra note 66, at § 897.30.
71. See id.
72. See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 17, at 903 (discussing "The Drug Approval
Process").
73. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1994); 21 C.F.R. § 312.20-23 (1997).
74. See Ken Fleiger, Testing In 'Real People,' FDA CONSUMER, Jan. 1988, at 13,
13-14.
75. See id.
76. See id.
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range of patients in an attempt to simulate the conditions of
actual clinical use and thereby confirm effectiveness, determine
appropriate dosages, labeling requirements, and longer-term
side effects." Phase III trials typically last one to four years.
Of all the new drugs for which INDs are submitted, only 2530% will clear Phase III testing.7 8
After completion of all clinical trials, the drug sponsor files a
New Drug Application (NDA) with the FDA.7 9 The NDA is a
comprehensive document containing virtually all available data
about the drug and its known effects. An NDA may consist of
over 100,000 pages of study results, 0 and the FDA's review of
an NDA often takes several years, although the agency now has
expedited procedures for high-priority drugs.8 '
Once a drug is approved for marketing, manufacturers must
comply with extensive regulations regarding drug labeling and
advertisement.8 2 Manufacturers must also submit periodic reports of adverse events (i.e., side effects, complications, or
deaths) associated with the use of the drug. At its discretion,
the FDA may also require postmarket surveillance studies,
known as Phase IV testing, that will enable the systematic
study of adverse events." In addition to monitoring adverse
events, the FDA will establish standards for the manufacturing,
processing, storage, and shipment of drugs. These standards,
known as Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs), allow the FDA
to inspect facilities and sanction manufacturers for the failure
to comply with these GMPs.8 4

77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 17, at 908.
80. See Norris, supra note 50, at 7.
81. See Dixie Farley, Benefit v. Risk: How FDA Approves New Drugs, FDA CONSUMER, Jan. 1995, at 23, 24-25.
82. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 351 (1994) (addressing false advertisement and
labeling); id. § 352 (providing that false and misleading drug advertising is specifically prohibited); see also Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 17, at 912.
83. See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 17, at 914.
84. See 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2) (1994).
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2. Devices
Until the mid 1970s, medical devices were subject only to
limited postmarket safety and labeling requirements. 5 The
FDA did not obtain full regulatory authority (including
premarket approval authority) over medical devices until the
passage of the Medical Device Amendments to sections 301-360
5 and the subsequent Safe Medical Devices Act
of the FFDCA,
7
of 1990.1

Under these statutes, a medical device is considered to be a
therapeutic product that "does not achieve its primary intended
purpose through chemical action within or on the body of man
or other animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of any of its primary intended purposes."88 The FDA's regulatory scheme classifies medical devices in a three-tiered system of escalating product controls, based
upon the risk that a particular device poses to consumers. As
with drugs, new devices are subject to premarket approval,
advertising, labeling, and manufacturing regulations, and certain postmarket reporting and surveillance requirements.89
3. Biologics
This category comprises products derived from living materials-humans, plants, animals, or microorganisms-when such
products are used in the treatment or prevention of disease. 0
The Public Health Service Act (PHSA)9 defines biological

85. See Walsh and Pyrich, supra note 17, at 903.
86. Pub. L. No. 94295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 55; 21
U.S.C. §§ 321(y), 331(e), 331(j), 331(1), 331(p)-(r), 334(a), 351(e)-(i), 352(e), 352(j),
352(o), 360(a)-(e), 360(i)-(k), 374(a), 374(e), 374(g), 374(r), 379(a); 42 U.S.C. § 3512
(1994)).
87. Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 333, 351,
353, 360(c)-(j), 360(1), 360(hh)-(ss), 383; 42 U.S.C. § 263(b)-(n) (1994)).
88. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1994).
89. See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 17, at 918-29 (discussing in detail medical
device regulation).
90. See Statement by Michael Beatrice of FDA's Center for Biologics Evaluation
and Research (CBER), in Kevin L. Ropp, Just What is a Biologic, Anyway?, FDA
CONSUMER, Apr. 1993, at 27, 27.
91. See scattered provisions of Title 42 of the United States Code.
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products as "any virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin,

vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, or analogous product, or arsphenamine or its derivatives
(or any other trivalent organic arsenic compound), applicable to
the prevention, treatment, or cure of diseases or injuries of
man." 2 Biologics were originally regulated under a statutory
scheme distinct from the one applied to foods and drugs, and
regulatory authority over biologics was vested in the National
Institutes of Health until jurisdiction was subsequently transferred to the FDA in 1972. 93
Because living materials are used in their manufacture, biological products are more fragile than drugs or medical devices,
and the composition of biologics is more difficult to standardize.94 Unlike the chemical compounds that make up a drug or
the inert parts of a medical device, most components of a biologic are highly sensitive to heat, light, contamination, motion,
and temperature. 95 Additionally, while drug composition and
purity can be determined by chemical analysis, not every component of a biological product can be easily identified or measured.98 For these reasons, oversight of manufacturing and
processing is a particularly important aspect of biologics regulation, and both biological products and the facilities that manufacture them must meet licensing requirements.9 v
The emergence of new hybrid therapeutics or "biological
drugs"98 such as cord blood highlighted a significant gap in the
PHS statute: the scheme had no provisions requiring a manufacturer to prove that a new biologic is chemically effective.
Under the broad statutory reach of the FFDCA, however, the
FDA has determined that biologics also fall simultaneously
under the regulatory provisions applicable to either drugs or
medical devices. 99 The FDA has the discretion, therefore, to
extend the requirement of an IND exemption to new biological

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (1994).
See 37 Fed. Reg. 12,865 (1972); see generally Korwek, supra note 57.
See Ropp, supra note 90, at 27-28.
See id. at 28.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See 21 C.F.R. § 312.2 (1997).
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drugs and to require a showing of clinical effectiveness prior to
marketing.'
Duplicate premarket approvals of the new product are not required. If the FDA asks a manufacturer to submit
both the product and the establishment license applications
that the PHS Act requires for a biologic, then the agency will
not also require a manufacturer to submit an NDA for the
same product.'
In 1998, the regulatory scheme for biological products will
undergo several important changes. As the various provisions of
the Food and Drug Administration Modernization and Accountability Act (and implementing regulations) 2 take effect, the
FDA's regulation of biologics will be streamlined and harmonized with the agency's drug regulations. The new law calls for
a single biologics license (BLA) that is intended to cover both
the biological product and the manufacturing facility. ' 3 As implementing regulations are promulgated, standards for biologics
approval will be altered to resemble more closely the current
standards for drug approval.
E. Blood as a Biological "Drug
Effective regulation of biologics has proven difficult because
the field of biological therapeutics is changing so rapidly.'
Under the FDA's conceptual framework, the categories of "drug"
and "biologic" are not mutually exclusive; rather, the agency
envisions that new biological products used to treat, prevent, or
cure diseases should be held to safety and effectiveness standards at least as stringent as those for conventional drugs.'05
In furtherance of this goal, the FDA's regulatory policies are
evolving in tandem with the development of new biotechnologies, but this evolution sometimes produces dissimilar requirements for what seem to be similar products.

100. See id.
101. See CoRD BLOOD DRAFT DOCUMENT, supra note 15.

102. Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2323 (1997).
103. See id.
104. See Noguchi, supra note 62, at 368 ("[Clell and gene therapies continue to
challenge existing statutes and regulations.").
105. See Ropp, supra note 90, at 28.
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Blood and blood components are one example. Today, cord
blood stem cells intended for transplantation would be considered a "therapeutic" serum, thereby meeting the definition of a
biological drug and triggering the safety and effectiveness requirements of premarket approval. °6 Yet historically, the FDA
has not required blood banks to submit INDs or to provide
premarket safety and effectiveness data for blood intended for
transfusion. Nor does the FDA subject hematopoietic stem cells
derived from bone marrow or from adult peripheral (circulatory)
blood to premarket approval, unless such cells are "substantially manipulated" or genetically altered to create new somatic cell
therapies.' °' Under the FDA's first proposal for cord blood regulation, however, hematopoietic stem cells derived from cord
blood would be subjected to the IND mechanism irrespective of
the extent to which the cells are manipulated, prior to transplantation. °8
On the whole, this regulatory disparity reflects changed expectations about the standards of safety and effectiveness that
new biologics must meet. Bone marrow transplantation was
developed prior to the era of strict FDA oversight of biological
therapies and, under the congressionally authorized National
Bone Marrow Donor Program of 1986,19 voluntary industry
standards are the primary form of regulation for the collection
and use of hematopoietic stem cells derived from bone marrow.
When Congress established the Bone Marrow Donor Program as
a statutory mechanism for oversight of BMT, the FDA abstained from further regulation, deeming bone marrow transplantation activities to fall under the purposely-unregulated
practice of medicine."0 On the heels of the HIV epidemic and
a nationwide scare about the safety of blood banks, however,

106. See 21 C.F.R. 600 (1997); see also Ropp, supra note 90, at 28.
107. See CENTER FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, DRAFT DOCUMENT CONCERNING THE REGULATION OF PERIPHERAL
BLOOD HEMATOPOIETIC STEM CELL PRODUCTS INTENDED FOR TRANSPLANTATION OR
FURTHER MANUFACTURE INTO INJECTABLE PRODUCTS, Feb. 1996 [hereinafter PERIPHERAL BLOOD DRAFT DOCUMENT]; see also, APPLICATION OF CURRENT STATUTORY AUTHORITIES TO HUMAN SOMATIC CELL THERAPY PRODUCTS AND GENE THERAPY PRODUCTS, 58
Fed. Reg. 53,248 (1993).
108. See PERIPHERAL BLOOD DRAFT DOCUMENT, supra note 107.
109. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 27.
110. See id.
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the FDA has begun to take a far more cautious approach toward biologics regulation."'
The cord blood industry and some researchers favor the BMT
model of private-sector oversight for new biologics; these opponents of new regulation would also prefer that the FDA adopt a
uniform approach to all blood products." 2 For the purpose of
federal regulation, researchers such as Dr. Harvey Klein of the
NIH insist that "blood is blood."" Klein and others argue
that, to the extent that the transplantation of cord blood is a
novel use of a blood component, such a use should fall within
the unregulated practice of medicine." In lieu of an entirely
new set of manufacturing regulations, these researchers believe
that cord blood can be safely collected and processed using
standard blood-banking procedures."'
Proponents of industry self-regulation argue that requiring
the IND process for cord blood stem cells, but not for stem cells
derived from bone marrow or from adult peripheral blood,
equates to illogically disparate treatment of similar products."' Oversight of the harvesting and use of cord blood stem
cells, the proponents maintain, can best be accomplished
through voluntary adherence to industry-developed standards." 7 The merits of this claim may be evaluated by examining the scientific debate over the maturity of the cord blood
transplantation field, and the legal and policy issues arising
from the commercialization of cord blood.

111. See Jeffery Goldbert, Next Target: Nicotine, THE N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 4,
1996, at 24 (noting that the FDA now closely regulates the nation's blood supply
after the agency found "widespread weaknesses" in the Red Cross system of tracking
donors and screening donated blood).
112. See Letter from Alan Goldhamer, Director of Technical Affairs, Biotechnology
Industry Association, to the FDA 1 (Apr. 25, 1996) (on file with the FDA).
113. See Letter From Harvey G. Klein, Chief of Transfusion Medicine, NIH Clinical
Center, to the FDA, 1 (Mar. 26, 1996) (on file with the FDA).
114. See discussion supra Part II.D (discussing the FDA regulatory scheme).
115. See, e.g., Letter from Moore, supra note 56, at 1 (stating that the processing
of cord blood samples prior to storage involves only "minor, well-established, and safe
laboratory procedures").
116. See id.
117. See id.
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SCIENTIFIC AND SAFETY CONCERNS IN PLACENTAL/

UMBILICAL CORD BLOOD TRANSPLANTATION

A. Are Cord Blood Stem Cells "Investigational"Drugs or 'Well
Characterized"Blood Products?
Scientifically, the extent of the similarity between cord blood
stem cells and stem cells derived from bone marrow or peripheral blood is debatable. Some researchers describe cord blood
stem cells as qualitatively and quantitatively distinct from the
stem cells found in samples of bone marrow and peripheral
blood." 8 Other researchers insist that all hematopoietic stem
cells are basically the same."' Whether stem cells from different sources are indeed similar remains an unanswered question
because no one has ever identified a human stem cell under a
microscope. To date, the presence of hematopoietic stem cells in
specimen blood can only be inferred from the presence of biological markers such as more mature daughter cells. 20
The question of similarity is an important one. If cord blood
stem cells are not well-characterized blood products, by definition cord blood storage and transplantation have unknown efficacy and pose novel safety risks that must be better understood
prior to commercial use. On the other hand, if cord blood cells
used for transplantation are functionally indistinguishable from

118. See Letter from Craig W.S. Howe, CEO, National Marrow Donor Program, to
the FDA 1 (July 26, 1996) (on file with the FDA) ("It is quite clear, however, that
these stem cells differ from marrow cells both quantitatively and qualitatively. Additionally, the immunocompetent lymphocytes in cord blood are dramatically dissimilar
from those in marrow blood.").
119. For example, Dr. Robertson Parkman, Director of the Bone Marrow Transplant Program at Children's Hospital in Los Angeles, has stated that "biologically we
view all hematopoietic stem cells as the same, that based on clinical settings, the
decisions about how you choose to get them will vary. And that is the most logical
way to look at them, rather than this fragmentation that is being set forth." Dr.
Robertson Parkman, Remarks at the Biological Response Modifiers Advisory Committee 268 (Feb. 28, 1996). The transcript of the committee hearing is available at the
Documents Management Branch of the FDA. See supra note 16.
120. See Dr. Yong-Hoon Lee, Branch Chief for the Blood and Plasma Branch of the
Division of Blood Applications, Office of Blood, CBER, FDA, Remarks at the Peripheral Blood Workshop, supra note 25, at 13 ("One of the problems is that we really
don't know how to clearly identify what a stem cell is. We know what a stem cell
does. We know what the phenotype of a subset containing stem cells is, but one cannot identify individual stem cells per se.").
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other hematopoietic stem cells, and if cord blood stem cells pose
no novel risks, then the FDA's lengthy and costly process of
new drug investigation may be unwarranted.
Although researchers have not resolved the question of the
actual physiological similarity between stem cells derived from
cord blood and those from bone marrow or peripheral blood,
there is evidence for a functional dissimilarity between cord
blood stem cell transplants and transplants of stem cells from
other sources. For example, the same properties of cord blood
that appear to convey less risk of graft versus host disease 21
may ultimately leave the recipient of a cord blood transplant
more prone to relapse." Another possible disadvantage of
cord blood transplants, pending the development of techniques
to artificially expand the quantity of stem cells in a specimen)
is that only one unit is available per transplant procedure, and
the amount in an individual specimen may be insufficient to
achieve engraftment."
Because both mother and infant must be tested for infectious
diseases such as hepatitis and HIV, cord blood donations are
more difficult to screen than bone marrow from adult donors'

Genetic screening of cord blood donations is particu-

larly problematic. Although an adult bone marrow donor has an
established medical history, the newborn cord blood donor is a

121. Cord blood lymphocytes appear relatively immature, potentially allowing for a
greater degree of HLA antigen disparity between donor and recipient, and possibly
reducing the risk and severity of graft versus host disease. See generally H.E.
Broxmeyer et a., Human Umbilical Cord Blood as a Potential Source of
Transplantable Hematopoietic Stem/Progenitor Cells, 86 PROc. NA'L AcAD. SCi.
U.SA 3828 (1989); M.Y. Gordon et al., Probability of ProgenitorRenewal (PPR) and
Production of Clonogenic Progeny (CFU-GM) by Primitive Adherent Progenitor Cells in
Adult Human Bone Marrow and Umbilical Cord Blood, 90 BR. J. HAEMATOLOGY 744
(1995); J.E. Wagner et al., Allogeneic Sibling Umbilical Cord Blood Transplantationin
Children with Malignant and Non-malignant Disease, 346 LANCET 214 (1995).
122. According to transplant specialist Joanne Kurtzberg of Duke Medical Center,
"[an] unresolved problem is whether the lower incidence of GVHD indicates a decrease in graft-versus-leukemia activity and thus an increase in the risk of leukemic
relapse." Joanne Kurtzberg et al., PlacentalBlood as a Source of Hematopoietic Stem
Cells for Transplantation into Unrelated Recipients, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED 157, 165
(1996).

123. It should be noted that banked placental/umbilical blood may be procured for
transplant quickly, in contrast to the four to six months often required to find an
unrelated bone marrow donor. See id.
124. See McCullough et al., supra note 48, at 609.
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medical "blank slate.""5 This lack of a medical history militates toward the most extensive screening possible prior to the
use of a cord blood sample in transplantation.
But genetic tests do not yet exist for most diseases, and if
they did, testing for the full range of known genetic diseases
might be prohibitively expensive and impractical. Furthermore,
even if both parents and infant were to receive every genetic
test currently conceivable, the pairing of maternal and paternal
genes could produce new mutations
that would be carried unde126
tected in the infant's DNA.

Long-term cryostatic storage of a newborn donor's own cord
blood-in anticipation that the blood might be used to treat
some hypothetical illness in the donor herself-is also unique to
the cord blood field. Such a use of stem cells can hardly be
characterized as anything other than experimental, because to
date, banked autologous blood has never been used for a transplant. Cord blood transplants are currently performed with
allogenic stem cells that have been frozen for relatively short
periods of time.'27
At present, there is little evidence that cord blood samples in
long term storage remain safe and effective for use, because
blood products are typically stored for less than thirty days."
Nor is there any evidence that autologous transplants are preferable to cord blood from a matched but unrelated donor. An
autologous transplant could reintroduce genetically-transmitted
disease; such a transplant would also test the possibility that a
donor's own stem cells might not perceive the body as a foreign
host, causing stem cell progeny to fail to mount the proper
immune response when they encounter diseased cells." In
fact, Joanne Kurtzberg, who has performed more cord blood
transplants than any other researcher in the field, stated in her
written comments to the FDA that transplanting physicians

125. See Letter from Howe, supra note 118, at 1.
126. See id; see also McCullough et. al, supra note 48, at 609.
127. See Silberstein & Jefferies, supra note 4, at 200; see also Robin DeRosa,
Blood Treatment Promises Much But Needs Regulation, USA TODAY, July 12, 1996, at
12A.
128. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 27.
129. See Statement of Dr. Paul McCurdy of NHLBI, in Cohen, supra note 3, at 3132.
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might well refuse to use autologous cord
blood because of such
30
unresolved safety and efficacy issues.

Other essential scientific questions regarding the safety and
efficacy of cord blood remain unanswered. For example, researchers have not yet determined through controlled trials
which methods of processing, freezing, and thawing samples are
adequate for long-term storage and reuse. 131 Nor is it known
what minimal amount of cord blood is necessary for
engraftment, particularly in adults.3 2 Cord blood has been
touted as requiring a less precise matching of HILA antigens between donor and recipient, but the extent to which transplants
can be mismatched without posing a threat to recipients is unknown. 33
Additionally, while cord blood storage has been promoted as a
universal form of health "insurance" that every parent should
consider," a range of factors contraindicate the harvesting
and subsequent use of cord blood: premature delivery complications, congenital fetal malformations, or any instance of maternal-fetal hemorrhage. 1 5 In such situations, the interests of the
child in the first moments of life are not advanced by the collection of cord blood for long-term storage. For example, rather
than being collected and stored for future use, cord blood may
be needed immediately for the emergency resuscitation of a
premature neonate. Delays in clamping the umbilical cord may
beneficially increase a newborn's blood volume and red blood
cell mass, while at the same time decreasing, probably to an
unusable amount, the volume of placental and cord blood available for harvesting.3 "

130. See Letter from Dr. Joanne Kurtzberg, Director, Pediatric Bone Marrow
Transplant Program, Duke University Medical Center, to the FDA 1 (July 10, 1996)
(on file with the FDA).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 27-28 (citing literature of ViaCord, one of the
nation's largest commercial cord blood banks).
135. See McCullough et al., supra note 48, at 614.
136. See Naomi Luban, Director of Transfusion Medicine, Childrens's National Medical Center, Remarks at the Cord Blood Workshop, supra note 27, at 61.
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B. Is Imposition of the IND Mechanism Necessary?
The scientific rationale for imposing IND requirements upon
cord blood storage and transplantation is simple. Because the
safest, most effective means of utilizing cord blood, and the
long-term safety and efficacy of cord blood transplants are unknown, any use of cord blood products is by definition investigational, and all recipients of cord blood transplants are effectively research subjects entitled to the protections guaranteed
by an IND. These protections include qualified investigators, informed consent, institutional review board approval of protocols,
and detailed tracking and reporting of clinical outcomes.'
By statute, the FDA is charged with assessing the safety and
effectiveness of biological products, such as cord blood, that are
used to treat diseases in humans.'3 8 This oversight requires
weighing the risks and benefits inherent in the marketing of
any product, and the FDA must base its judgments upon scientific evidence derived from clinical trials."9 The scientific
method is inherently conservative, and the findings of any one
study are only considered valid to the extent that they are
replicated, over time and by other investigators. " Without
sufficient data, therefore, there is no scientific basis for determining a priori that a product is safe and effective, even when
the results from one or two initial studies appear promising.
Several researchers who provided the FDA with written comments on the first draft regulatory proposal pointed to significant gaps in scientists' knowledge about cord blood transplantation.'4 In general, these commentators noted that the field of
cord blood transplantation is considered experimental primarily
because of its youth. Only about 200 such transplants have
been performed, almost all of them in children, and the longest-

137. See generally supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
138. See sources cited supra note 66.
139. See Farley, supra note 81, at 31 ("Controlled clinical trials are the only basis,
under law, for demonstrating effectiveness.").
140. For a discussion of the scientific method, see generally Bert Black et al.,
Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge,
72 TEX. L. REV 715 (1994).
141. See, e.g., Letter from Kurtzberg, supra note 130, at 1; Letter from Lenfant,
supra note 41, at 1.
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surviving recipients have lived with their transplants for less
than ten years.
The risk of potential complications continues throughout a
transplant recipient's lifetime,' and long-term survival rates
are best evaluated by carefully tracking cord blood patients and
comparing them to patient groups that have received conventional BMT. The IND regulations generate just this sort of
systematic data collection and patient follow-up. The regulations
also insure that adverse reactions and bad outcomes are duly
reported (underreporting appears to be a problem under current
systems of voluntary reporting to patient registries).
The industry's alternative to the FDA's proposal would skip
the IND process of clinical investigation and move directly to
establishing licensing standards and good manufacturing practices for cord blood. In the view of some researchers, this proposal actually risks hampering the development of the field by
prematurely defining standards. Pablo Rubenstein of the New
York Blood Center's Placental/Umbilical Cord Program'" concluded in his comments to the FDA that an IND is a more
flexible approach to regulation of a developing field than the
codification of strict licensing rules, and that only an IND will
ensure "rigorous reporting" of the outcomes of all transplants.'45 Comprehensive outcome information is essential for
developing eventual licensing standards; complete risk data are
also information that, ethically, transplant patients are entitled
to receive.'46 Concurring with this view, the NHLBI, sponsor
of the NYBC pilot bank and of the new network of public cord
blood banks, stated in a letter to the FDA that its banks plan
to comply with IND regulations."'

142. See generally NCI REPORT, supra note 21.
143. See Stephen J. Ackerman, Watching for Problems that Testing May Have
Missed, FDA CONSUMIER, Jan. 1988, at 51, 52.
144. The New York Blood Center is the site of the original NIH-funded pilot program in unrelated donor transplantation. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 15-16.
145. See generally Letter from Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 1-3 and attachment.
146. See id.
147. See Letter from Lenfant, supra note 41, at 2.
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C. Will the IND Requirement Retard Scientific Progress in the
Field of Cord Blood Transplantation?
Virtually without exception, public commentary critical of the
FDA's draft regulatory document reflects a similar theme: FDA
regulation will retard scientific development in the field of cord
blood transplantation. In the FDA's cord blood files are many
letters from concerned citizens containing identical language,
seemingly generated by advocates of commercial cord blood
banking, to the effect that the FDA's approach would "interfere
with the ability of trained specialists to practice medicine."" s
Such comments mistakenly associate the viability of commercial
blood banking with progress 'in cord blood transplantation research.
Given the promising results of initial transplantation studies,
the number of cord blood research programs is likely to increase, fed by the growing availability of donations through a
network of public banks. Qualified physicians conducting transplants under approved protocols will not be prevented from
utilizing cord blood under an IND, nor will an IND prevent
public or hospital banks from accepting "directed" donations of
blood from families who wish to store their newborn's cord
blood for the use of a critically-ill family member.'
It is possible, however, that requiring a period of clinical
development would retard the commercialization of cord blood
banking, given that insurance companies are unlikely to cover
cord blood transplants that would be deemed "experimental"
under an IND. 5 ' Since IND regulations would preclude stor-

148. See, e.g., Letter from Steve and Ruth Gonsoski to the FDA 1 (July 15, 1996)
(on file with the FDA).
149. One selling point for private cord blood banks is the opportunity to store
directed donations, particularly the cord blood of newborn relatives intended for the
use of an ill family member. Directed donations may be important for minority and
mixed-race families, whose members are more difficult to match to unrelated donors.
The directed donations of at-risk families have been stored and transplanted without
the services of private blood banks; for example, the cord blood of a younger relative
used to transplant Michael Major, recipient of the first cord blood transplant in the
D.C. area, is currently being banked at Children's Hospital in D.C. See Cohen, supra
note 3, at 12.
150. See id.
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age facilities from recovering a profit during the IND period of
clinical development, it is also possible that facilities that operate solely for the purpose of profiting from the storage of cord
blood may not survive. 5'
Yet, beyond vehement protestations that IND and PLA requirements will hinder advancement of the field, advocates of
private cord blood banking offer, little evidence that commercialization is critical to cord blood research. Private banks cater to
a small number of parents who are affluent (or anxious) enough
to purchase storage for a cord blood specimen of dubious value.
Meanwhile, the greatest need in cord blood transplantation will
be for specimens from unrelated donors.'5 2 It is even conceivable that a burgeoning private sector banking program might
harm cord blood research, if private banks siphon off donations
that would otherwise go to the public banks that are participating in clinical trials.
Lastly, it is important to recognize that scientific arguments
may mask other considerations in the cord blood controversy.
Financial conflicts of interest also cloud the debate between
scientists over the appropriateness of FDA regulation. Leading
researchers such as Hal Broxmeyer, co-founder of the field of
cord blood transplantation, have voiced scientific objections to
IND and PLA requirements for cord blood.'5 3 Yet, Broxmeyer
himself was a founder of the first private cord blood bank, and
although he has sold his interest in the company, he reportedly
remains a paid industry consultant." Likewise, Paul Billings,
the Stanford geneticist and outspoken opponent of IND regulations for cord blood,'5 5 is also retained as a paid consultant by

151. See id. at 15.
152. See Eliot Marshall, Clinical Promise, Ethical Quandary, 271 SCIENCE 586, 587
(1996).
153. See Letter from Hal Broxmeyer, Indiana University School of Medicine, to the
FDA 1 (Apr. 25, 1996) (on file with the FDA).
154. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 27-28; see also id. at 27, 31 (noting that Biocyte
marketing efforts, including the mailing of videos to expectant parents, prompted calls
of complaint to FDA).
155. Billings heads the nonprofit affiliate of a private cord blood bank, and he
favors adoption of standards developed by industry task force. See Letter from Paul
Billings, President, International Cord Blood Foundation, to Cynthia Fisher, President,
ViaCord Inc. 1 (July 9, 1996) (on file with the FDA). Billings has sought media attention through a "bioecology" campaign aimed at stopping "cord blood waste." See
Cohen, supra note 3 at 28.
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a private cord blood bank. Perhaps these and other scientists
can hardly be criticized for participating in commercial ventures
when federal government policies increasingly favor the privatization of scientific research. 5 ' Nonetheless, fully-informed
public debate over cord blood regulation requires disclosure and
consideration of scientists' private financial interest, where
these interests create the potential for conflict between the ends
of public and private gain.
IV. POLICY ISSUES IN PLACENTAL/UMBILICAL
CORD BLOOD BANKING
A. Arguments for Patient Access and Regulatory Reform

A common fear reflected in parent's letters to the FDA is
that regulation of cord blood services will limit patients' access
to critical lifesaving therapies, or, at the very least, will deny
parents' "right to choose" private cord blood banking.'57 The
FDA file contains well over one hundred letters, many with
baby photos attached, from parents who often seem to believe
that FDA regulations will foreclose the possibility of cord blood
storage altogether.'58 These parents' fears are amplified by
strident newspaper editorials opposing FDA regulations, which
one writer claimed would create "a devastating loss of life."'59
Although cord blood transplantation through approved research programs would remain available to patients, FDA regulations could limit access in one important respect: commercial
banks offering nationwide private storage might cease to operate. The absence of an opportunity to bank privately as a form
of medical "insurance" is a questionable loss, given that the
long-term storage of cord blood, particularly autologous specimens, has no clear medical utility at present. Yet parents who
assert a right of access, even to unproved drugs and therapies
of uncertain utility, are echoing a sentiment that is at the
heart of the FDA reform movement.

156.
157.
158.
159.

See generally Bulleit & Bonnet, supra note 46.
See, e.g., Letter from Gonsoski, supra note 148, at 1.
See generally Public Comments submitted to the FDA, supra note 16.
Walter Shapiro, Don't Limit Patient Access, USA TODAY, July 12, 1996, at
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Reform advocates in Congress and industry maintain that the
FDA fails to adequately consider the hidden costs in lives and
suffering to patients who are denied rapid access to new drugs
and therapies."6 To a greater or lesser degree, critics of the
FDA urge a shift from current premarket approval requirements to a system of postmarket surveillance in which thresholds to market entry are lowered and products are removed
from the market only when sufficient evidence accumulates that
a product endangers public health. 6 '
Increased access to new therapies afforded by post-market
surveillance and fast-track drug approvals would bring an inescapable increase in the level of risk to consumers. The thalidomide disaster is a paradigmatic example. In the twenty countries where this sedative was placed on the market without an
extensive premarket approval procedure, an estimated total of
7,000 to 11,000 limbless babies were born.'62 In the United
States, by contrast, the premarket approval process delayed the
marketing of thalidomide sufficiently that FDA could avert a
large-scale public health crisis." Similarly, some researchers
and AIDS activist groups who successfully lobbied for fast-track
approval of new AIDS drugs are now questioning whether it
was wise to allow such expensive medications to be "haphazardly tested" and allowed on the market without any clear demonstration of safety and effectiveness."M
Biologic drugs, vulnerable as they are to contamination, degradation, and unforeseen side effects, will inevitably pose some
risk of adverse events regardless of how carefully the drugs are
researched and developed. The difference between premarket
research and postmarket surveillance, however, is that in clinical trials, participants are informed up front about the experi-

160. See generally C. Frederick Beckner, III, The FDA's War on Drugs, 82 GEO.
L.J. 529 (1993); see also Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 17, at 941.
161. See Beckner, supra note 160, at 560.
162. See Morton Mintz, The Cure That Could Kill You; FDA Reforms Are Bad
Medicine, WASH. POST, July 14, 1996, at C1.
163. See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 17, at 37 ("iTihe FDA was widely praised for
not having approved thalidomide for use in the United States.").
164. See Matthew C. Lovell, Second Thoughts: Do the FDA's Responses to A Fatal
Drug Trial and The AIDs Activist Community's Doubts About Early Access to Drugs
Hint at a Shift in Basic FDA Policy? 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 273, 277 (1996).
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mental nature of the therapy and the full range of risks and
benefits involved.
By contrast, once the "experimental" label is removed and a
product is released to the market, consumers become unwitting
participants in a large-scale clinical trial. In the market, information provided to consumers may be highly asymmetric. Advertising will tout the benefits of a product with little mention
of risk, unless the product has been subjected to labeling requirements through FDA drug and biologics regulation. Consumer "choice" in the marketplace of medical care is meaningless if consumers lack sufficient safety information about a
therapeutic product, and in the case of cord blood, many of the
necessary data about safety and effectiveness have yet to be obtained.
B. Private Accreditation Versus Government Regulation
Opponents of FDA regulation argue that the industry should
be allowed to police itself, backed up by FDA inspections that
would insure compliance with industry standards.165 The FDA
cord blood docket contains various proposals and private accreditation schemes offered by professional societies, by an industry
task force, or by individual cord blood banks."
To entrust regulatory oversight to the private sector, the FDA
must make a policy judgment that the field of cord blood transplantation has matured to the point where commercial ventures
are appropriate. In its initial draft document, the FDA cites
evidence to the contrary. The agency suggests that the "vigorous commercialization" of cord blood banking, including the
patenting of cord blood cryopreservation, has occurred prior to
careful consideration of troubling ethical and legal issues. Furthermore, rapid, unregulated commercialization is engendering

165. See generally Public Comments submitted to the FDA, supra note 16.
166. See, e.g., Letter from Allen C. Eaves, President, International Society of
Hematotherapy and Graft Engineering, to the FDA 1 (Mar. 23, 1996) (on file with
the FDA) ("We believe [that the] FDA should accept industry standards for cell processing facilities . . . [and] we recommend that the FDA . . . review facility license
applications and conduct compliance inspections. . . .).
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1. Unresolved Bioethics Issues
A hiatus in the commercialization of cord blood services
would give researchers, medical ethicists, and policymakers
time to consider thorny ethical issues posed by cord blood
transplantation. Chief among these are questions of genetic
privacy and informed consent.
The medical information that must be collected and linked to
a cord blood specimen is extensive, because both the mother
and the child must be considered donors. This sensitive compilation of information, which includes a medical history, the
mother's sexual history, drug use, and prior travel outside the
United States,'" must be carefully recorded and preserved for
the life of the specimen. In the case of cryopreserved cord blood,
the life of the specimen is a question that remains to be answered."6 9
Additionally, donating mothers must also agree to genetic
testing, testing that simultaneously reveals genetic information
about the entire family. A medical record containing genetic
data poses special privacy concerns, because individuals with
known genetic liabilities may encounter difficulties obtaining
health insurance or employment.7" Preserving the privacy of
donor identity will be equally important, because transplant recipients who have relapsed may attempt to contact the cord
blood donor to request a bone marrow transplant. Some researchers fear that the possibility of such requests might discourage widespread cord blood donation.'
Screening samples for genetic defects and preserving donors'
medical privacy are problematic aspects of cord blood donation.

167. See CORD BLOOD DRAFT DOCUMENT, supra note 15.
168. See generally McCullough et al., supra note 48; see also CORD BLOOD DRAFT
DOCUMENT, supra note 15.

169. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 13.
170. See ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 40, at 20.
171. See Jerry Sugarman et al., Ethical Aspects of Banking Placental Blood for
Transplantation,274 JAMA 1783, 1784 (1995).
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The question of what constitutes fully informed consent to cord
blood donation is correspondingly complex. Consent procedures
may be inadequate unless, prior to giving consent for a donation, parents are informed that they and their baby will be
tested, and may receive positive test results, for genetic disorders for which there is no known treatment. Despite uncertainty about what types of genetic tests may one day be developed,
cord blood donation agreements must also incorporate a mechanism for obtaining consent for what is called "look-back" testing: future screening of the specimen with tests not yet in existence at the time of donation. 172 In an optimal consent process, parents would be instructed to consider carefully the ramifications of signing a blanket "look-back" authorization that
waives all restrictions on the future genetic testing of their
child's cord blood.
Conceivably, as an element of informed consent, parents
might be told that the practices of testing the newborn's cord
blood specimen for genetic disorders-and of retesting the specimen as new genetic tests are devised-violate a key policy
recommendation of the nonprofit National Research Council
(NRC). In a recent report, the NRC advocated that minors
should not be tested for genetic diseases until effective treatments for those diseases become available, due to the psychological and social injuries that may result from positive test
findings. 17 Parents, who serve as surrogates for a child who
cannot yet give consent for genetic testing, deserve to be educated about the risks of identifying their child's genetic liabilities. Parents should weigh the social and psychological impact
of such information against the small probability that their
child will ever benefit from the storage of a cord blood
specimen. 74
Voluntary standards that have been devised by the cord
blood industry do not adequately address issues of consent and
privacy.'75 The FDA's IND process, by contrast, requires in-

172. See id. at 1784.
173. See ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 40, at 10.
174. Dr. Paul McCurdy of NHLBI has estimated that the chance of needing a cord
blood transplant for leukemia, the most common disease treatable in this manner, at
1 in 200,000. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 15.
175. See id. at 30.
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stitutions that sponsor research to review bioethics concerns
through the mechanism of institutional review boards. Thus, to
the extent that the FDA ultimately decides not to classify cord
blood as an investigatory new drug, ethical issues are likely to
be addressed only in an inconsistent, ad hoc fashion.
2. Commodification: "Property" Rights in Cord Blood
To treat cord blood like any other commodity is to open a
Pandora's box of property law conundrums. For example, how
will ownership rights-including the right to sell a cord blood
specimen, to destroy it, to designate it for a particular
transplant recipient, or to profit from its use in scientific
advances-be divided among infants, parents, physicians, and researchers? To the extent that a market develops, conflicts
among potential holders of property interests in cord blood are
likely to arise. Parents who decide to discontinue cord blood
banking may wish to sell their child's specimen to recoup the
costs of collection and storage, rather than continuing to preserve the child's "property" interest in its own cord blood. If
parents fall behind in payments, commercial blood banks may
assert the right to appropriate and resell banked specimens.
Researchers who develop valuable therapies from cord blood
may end up competing with donors to capture the resulting
profits. 1 6
Meanwhile, private companies have already asserted intellectual property rights to procedures and techniques involved in
cord blood storage and transplantation."' At present, it is unclear whether intellectual property protection will, as its proponents argue, stimulate the growth of the cord blood storage industry, or will simply impose a crushing level of royalty expense on nonprofit therapeutic and research users of cord blood.

176. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479
(1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991) (involving suit against physician for conversion of patient's property interests in valuable cell line that physician developed from
patient's leukemic spleen cells).
177. See generally Declan Butler, U.S. Company Comes Under Fire Over Patent on
Umbilical Chord Cells, 382 NATuRE 99 (1996).
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a. Property Rights in the Body
The traditional, if shopworn, legal metaphor for the concept
of property rights is "a bundle of sticks." Each stick in the
metaphorical bundle represents a right that the owner has in
the property as against other members of society (e.g., a right
to sell the property, to destroy it, or to prevent others from
using it). To a point, these sticks or rights can be severed from
178
the bundle without destroying the core property interest.
With respect to rights in the human body, courts make a clear
distinction between two potential sticks in an owner's bundle:
(1) the right to control the disposition of a body (or body part);
19
and (2) the right to sell it.
Courts have traditionally recognized that individuals and
their next-of-kin have a right to determine the disposition of
bodies after death. 8 ° This right falls short of the sort of property interest that would permit the sale of human organs or tissues, because the latter possibility arouses widespread ethical
concern, if not moral revulsion. 8 ' The inclusion of disposition,
but not commodification interests in the bundle of "property"
rights attached to the human body is also a uniform characteristic of state and federal organ donor laws. These laws authorize patients or next-of-kin to designate organs or body parts
for transplantation after death, but forbid commercial transactions in the same.'8 2

178. For example, an easement to cross a piece of land can be sold without negating the landowner's ownership interest in the underlying real property. See generally J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711
(1996).
179. See infra notes 180-88 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that
removal of deceased's corneas without permission of next-of-kin is deprivation of constitutionally protected property interest).
181. See Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479, 497
(1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991) (Arabian, J., concurring) ("Plaintiff has asked
us to recognize and enforce a right to sell one's own body tissues for profit. He entreats us to regard the human vessel-the single most venerated and protected subject in any civilized society-as equal with the basest commercial commodity. He
urges us to commingle the sacred with the profane.") (emphasis in original).
182. See, e.g., National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98
Stat. 2339 (codified as adopted at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-74 (1988)); see generally Gloria J.
Banks, Legal and Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society's Most Vulnerable Partici-
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At common law, courts have adopted a similar anticommodification approach to the living human body. In one
important state law case, Moore v. Regents of the University of
California," the California Supreme Court concluded, on public policy grounds, that "biological sources" do not possess proprietary rights in their own cells and tissues."' The Moore
court denied the plaintiff, a leukemic patient, a tort action for
the conversion of his property interest in a valuable cell line
developed from the plaintiffs own diseased spleen cells. The
majority concluded that human dignity would be diminished,
and medical research chilled, by any commodification of body
parts in their "unmodified" (raw) form. 8 ' To the extent that
courts have recognized any type of antemortem (before death)
ownership interests in cells or tissues (e.g., in frozen sperm,
ova, or embryos), the rights recognized have been only quasiproperty in nature, usually limited to the right to determine
the disposition of a frozen specimen. 8 '
As a general principle, human organs and tissues, including
some human cells under the Moore analysis, can be given away,
but not sold. Historically, blood has been an exception to this
rule.8 7 Society has long accommodated a market in blood and
blood products without strong ethical objections, perhaps because the human blood supply is replenishable (i.e., it is constantly regenerated by the body)" and, thus, blood donation
does not deprive the donor of something irreplaceable.

pants in a Commercialized Organ Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45
(1995) (reviewing federal and state laws concerning organ donation and transplantation).
183. 793 P.2d 479, cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991).
184. Most courts have skirted property law questions by deeming blood donation to
be the provision of a service, not the sale of a good. Thus, blood sales have been exempted from the warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. The transfer

of any property interest in the blood itself blood is regarded as only incidental to this
service. See Banks, supra note 183, at 49.
185. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 492-93 (distinguishing between raw or unmodified
human cells, and cultured cells lines, which are the product of human invention).
186. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (involving dispute over
ownership interests in frozen sperm and fertilized embryos).
187. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 489 n.23.
188. See Banks, supra note 182, at 47 (explaining the distinction between regenerative and non-regenerative human cells and organs).
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The right to sell cord blood cannot be predicated on this
distinction, however. Cord blood stem cells are potentially valuable precisely because they are not regenerated within the body
of the newborn donor. In this way, cord blood resembles a kidney, an organ for which no legal market exists, more than it
does a pint of blood plasma, a commodity that can be bought
and sold. Unfortunately, the anti-sale provisions of state and
federal organ donation statutes probably do not reach cord
blood, given the statutory exceptions for blood and blood products.'89 Without legislative intervention, therefore, there may
be few legal barriers to the sale of cord blood, unless judges can
be convinced that cord blood stem cells, like the leukemic
spleen cells in Moore, should not be treated as a marketable
commodity.
Yet, even if legislators were to grant cord blood the same
status as an organ or tissue, by permitting individuals only the
right to donate cord blood, ownership of the banked specimen
might still be contested. Although genetically, cord blood is the
child's blood, the umbilical cord or placenta from which the
blood is drawn are tissues that once belonged to the mother's
body, as well as, to the child's. If the mother subsequently
decides to use stored cord blood for the treatment of her own
disease 9 ° can her child exercise an ownership veto over this
decision? Faced with such a dispute, perhaps a court might
conclude that both mother and child share a quasi-property
interest in the cord blood specimen.
Alternatively, courts may decide that cord blood is the exclusive property of the newborn infant. An infant lacks the legal
capacity to grant consent, either to the medical procedure used
to collect the cord blood specimen, or to the disposition of his
cord blood through sale or allogenic transplantation. The infant
will require a surrogate decision maker, therefore, to make
choices about how and when the sample will be used, sold, or
destroyed.

189. See id.; see also discussion supra Part II.E.
190. This is a possibility that is raised in some cord blood marketing literature.
See, e.g., United States Cryobanks of Florida, Umbilical Cord Blood-Frequently Asked
Questions (last modified Jan. 3, 1996) <http://www.uscryo-cord.com/umbilfaq.html>.
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As guardians of a minor child, parents have the legal capacity to act as surrogate decision makers, yet most courts adhere
to the doctrine that parents may only authorize medical procedures that are in the best interests of the child.' 9 ' From a
property law perspective, parents are also constrained by a
fiduciary duty to act in the child's financial best interests and
not to profit at the child's expense.'92 Parents' fiduciary obligations and the common-law "best interest" doctrine may give
rise to a legal responsibility on the part of parents to preserve
cord blood for the benefit of the child donor, rather than using
the sample for allogenic transplantation in a sibling or other
recipient. The parents who conceive one child in order to obtain
cord blood for the benefit of another might, in theory, risk violating a legal obligation to the newborn donor.
Although the absence of case law on cord blood makes the
foregoing conclusion speculative, one state court's approach to
the somewhat analogous situation of bone marrow donation
suggests that parental decisions regarding harvesting and
transplantation of their infants' cord blood might be subject to
close judicial scrutiny. In Curran v. Bosze,' the Illinois Supreme Court faced a wrenching dilemma: the custodial parent
of three and one-half year old twins refused to permit the
children to be tested as possible bone marrow donors." The
potential bone marrow recipient was the twin's half-brother,
who required a transplant to treat a rare form of leukemia. The
father of all three children sought a court order to compel testing and subsequent bone marrow harvesting, should the twins
proved an adequate transplant match for his twelve year old
95
son.1
In deciding this difficult case, the judge considered two traditional legal standards for surrogate medical decision making.
The first standard, advocated by the father, was the doctrine of
substituted judgment, which requires a decision maker to establish by "clear and convincing evidence" what decision the pa-

191. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §2(b) (1957).

192. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
18, at 115-117 (5th ed. 1984).
193. 566 N.E.2d 1319 (IM. 1990).
194. See id. at 1322.
195. See id. at 1321.
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tient would make if restored to competency."' The alternative
standard, proposed by the twins' mother, requires a surrogate
medical decision maker to act in the "best interests" of the incompetent patient.197 The Curran court determined that the
"substituted judgment" standard was inappropriate when a
patient has never been capable of reasoned judgment.' 9 In
such cases, the court reasoned, a surrogate would have no basis
to conclude that if competent, a patient would choose to undergo the procedure.' Applying the alternative, "best interests"
standard, the court noted the absence of any close relationship
between the three children that might result in a psychological
benefit to the twins, should the transplant procedure succeed.
Weighing the absence of benefit against the identified risks, the
court denied the father's request to compel the procedure. 00
The Curran court did not address whether the twins had any
form of property interest in their bone marrow, but the judge's
opinion referenced the principles of principles of physical selfdetermination and "inviolability" upon which the right to refuse
medical treatment is founded.2"' Absent clear evidence of a
benefit to the patient, the Curran court saw no justification for
permitting a parent to abrogate a child's right to bodily integrity.2"2 In a Curran-like dispute over the cord blood, a similar
cost-benefit analysis would also require a judge to consider any
legally-recognized property interest that newborn has in its own
cord blood. Applying a Curran approach in the context of cord
blood donation, a court might readily second-guess parental
decision making, given the potential for conflict between the
ultimate interests of newborn donors and their parents.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
1989)).
202.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 1325.
id. at 1331.
id. at 1325.
id. at 1326.
id. at 1344-45.
id. at 1322-26 (citing In Re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (M11.

See id. at 1325-26.
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b. Intellectual Property Rights in Cord Blood
Although some bioethicists and policymakers remain troubled
by the prospect, 3 the Supreme Court has firmly established
the viability of intellectual property rights in living cells, tissues, and organisms created through human invention.Y In
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,°5 the Court held that a genetically
engineered bacterium used to degrade crude oil fell within the
scope of the federal patent statute.0 6 This statute permits
patents for, inter alia, "the manufacture or composition of matter .... 2."7 Federal patent protection has subsequently been
extended to human cell lines and to entire animals whose genetic composition has been modified.2 ' Inventors may also obtain patents for processes or machines used in the handling or
storage of living organisms, so long as the subject of the patent
is novel, 20useful,
and non-obvious to someone skilled in the rele9
vant art.
Under the prevailing legal standard for patentable subject
matter, a United States corporation, Biocyte, was granted a
patent in 1993 covering "hematopoietic stem and progenitor
cells of neonatal or fetal blood, that are cryopreserved, and the
therapeutic uses of such stems and progenitor cells upon thawing."21 2In 1996, Biocyte obtained similar patent protection in
Europe. " The validity of these cord blood patents-which, if

203. See generally Mark Crawford, Religious Groups Join Animal Patent Battle, 237
SCIENCE 480 (1987).

204. See generally Leon R. Kass, Patenting Life, 63 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.

S0cY 571 (1981); Thomas Moga, Transgenic Animals as Intellectual Property (or the
Patented Mouse That Roared), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 511 (1994).

205. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
206. See id. at 318.
207. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
208. In 1988, the United States Patent and Trademark Office issued its first animal patent for a genetically-altered mouse developed at Harvard University. See U.S.
PATENT No. 4,736,866.
209. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-04 (1994).
210. Butler, supra note 177, at 99.
211. See David Rowan, Analysis Money in Genes: Signing up to "A Patent on Life";
Britain Agrees Today to an EU Directive that Could Mean that the Ownership of Your
Blood Cells and Your Genes Could be Transferred to a Company that Holds the Patents. What's Going On?, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 27, 1997, available in 1997 WL
14743278; TransplantationGroups Say European Blood Cell Patent Unethical, CANCER
WEEKLY PLUS, Mar. 3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 6219335.
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upheld, will require all users of cord blood to pay royalties to
Biocyte-is currently the subject of legal challenges in the United States and Europe. 1 2
Researchers fear that patent rights to the exclusive use of
cryogenic techniques for cord blood storage and transplantation
will make nonprofit cord blood research prohibitively expensive,
by forcing users of cord blood to pay costly royalties or to
defend against infringement actions.213 European scientists
have been particularly outspoken in their objection to the
Biocyte patents, citing prohibitions against for-profit organ
donation in a resolution of the International Society of Transplantation. For instance, Eliane Gluckman, head of the European research team that performed one of the first allogenic cord
blood transplant operations, has urged on behalf of a consortium of European researchers that donations of human cells in
any form
should be "free and anonymous" as a matter of public
214
policy.
Such ethical objections will have little bearing on the ultimate validity of the Biocyte patents in the United States.1 5
Instead, the legal process for re-examining the patent will focus
upon a narrow question: is there evidence in the scientific literature or elsewhere that the Biocyte process for storing cord
blood in liquid nitrogen was contemplated by others prior to the
dates on which the company filed its patent applications, contradicting the company's claims of novelty and non-obviousness? 26 Absent evidence to the contrary, public policy arguments against the patenting of human cells and related therapies are unlikely to persuade the reviewing court. The Supreme
Court has stated clearly that Congress must define the ethical
limits of patentable subject matter, because the issue is "a

212. See Pete Mitchell, European Researchers Condemn U.S. Firm's Cord-BloodStorage Patent, 349 THE LANCET 1232 (1997).
213. See id. at 1232-33.
214. See id.

215. The European patent process does contain a mechanism for challenging patents where the patent grant is contrary to public order or morality. See generally
ARTICLE 53, EPC CONVENTION ON THE GRANT OF EUROPEAN PATENTS, 5 October 1973,

as amended 17 December 1991 and by the decisions of the Administrative Council of
the European Patent Organization of 21 December 1978, 13 December 1994, 20 October 1995, and 5 December 1996.
216. See Butler, supra note 177, at 99.
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matter of high policy for resolution within the legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination, and study that
legislative bodies can provide, and courts cannot."21
3. Unsafe Practices
A number or researchers have written to the FDA or have
otherwise expressed their concern that unregulated cord blood
banking activity poses a threat to the public health.2 18 Concerns cited include unsafe practices in the harvesting, transportation, and storage of cord blood.
In an apparent attempt to avoid creating the regulatory trigger of a nexus to interstate commerce, some private cord blood
banks request that parents ship specimens to the bank via
express mail, a system that provides no form of temperature
control or protection against contamination.2 19 One physician
has complained to the FDA that the collection "kit" provided to
his expectant patient was wholly unsuited for the transportation of blood and consisted of a "grossly inadequate" packaging
material likely to leak blood products.
Another letter expressed concern that some cord blood specimens have been preserved in fetal calf serum, raising serious viral transmission
issues."
Cord blood storage and transplantation practices have also
been the subject of criticism. According to one leading researcher, some blood banks fail to test whether the cells that they
store remain viable and free from contamination.' There are
concerns that patient identifying information is not being adequately maintained and tracked and that cord blood transplants
are being performed by persons with little experience in stem
cell transplantation.2 " A particular danger is that transplants
217. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980).
218. See generally Public Comments submitted to the FDA, supra note 16.
219. See Letter from Kutzburg, supra note 130, at 1.
220. See Letter from Robert J. Carpenter, M.D., Associate Professor of Obstetrics
and Gynecology, University of Texas Medical School, to the FDA 1 (Aug. 21, 1996)
(on file with the FDA).
221. See Letter from Howe, supra note 118, at 1.
222. See Letter from John E. Wagner, Director, International Cord Blood Transplant Registry, to the FDA 1 (July 26, 1996) (on file with the FDA).
223. See Letter from Kutzburg, supra note 130, at 1; see also Letter from Carpen-
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are being performed without proper antigen typing, resulting in
dangerous HLA antigen mismatches that increase the likelihood
of graft-versus-host disease.2"
4. Truth in Advertising
Manipulative promotional schemes and unsubstantiated
claims about the therapeutic utility of cord blood have been the
source of repeated complaints to the FDA.' One of the more
controversial marketing practices in commercial cord blood
banking is the mailing of unsolicited promotional videos to
expectant parents. The content of such materials, which exhort
parents to make the "potentially lifesaving" decision to store
their infant's cord blood, for fees typically amounting to more
than $1,000 plus additional yearly charges,2 " exploits parents'
most basic fears for the health of a newborn child.27
Most troublesome from a regulatory standpoint are the highly
misleading claims common to much cord blood advertising material. Promotions portray cord blood transplants, not as an
experimental medical procedure, but as a routine alternative to
BMT. 2' The literature typically does not distinguish between
autologous donations, which may be useless, and allogenic donations. 22 Additionally, while obscuring the rarity of the potential need for a cord blood transplant, these advertisements
imply that cord blood can or soon will be used to cure everything from AIDs to cancer. In one particularly egregious example, a cord blood bank in the state of Florida offers promotional
materials on the World Wide Web that cite the "one in eight"
risk of breast cancer among women in the United States and

ter, supra note 220, at 1; Wagner, supra note 222, at 1.
224. See Letter from John F. DiPersio, Chief, Division of Bone Marrow Transplantation and Stem Cell Biology, Washington University School of Medicine, to the FDA
1 (Mar. 22, 1996) (on file with the FDA); see also Wagner, supra note 222, at 1.
225. See Telephone Interview with Harvath, supra note 14.
226. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 11.
227. Viacord Inc., one of the largest private banks in Boston, charges $1,500 to
harvest cord blood, and an additional $95 per year to store the specimen. See Claudia
Kalb & Melinda Beck, Seizing Nature's Lifeline, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 29, 1996, at 75.
228. See Parents Fear Rules, supra note 16, at A2.
229. See id.
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* suggest that in light of this risk, "storing cord blood makes
sense as a source of stem cells for the mother....

,230

Even if gene therapy for breast cancer did exist, there is no
evidence that cord blood stored today could ever be used for
such treatment. Indeed, no one knows if cord blood stem cells
that have been frozen for more than a few years even remain
viable. Yet, without full regulatory oversight of the cord blood
industry, the FDA will be unable to invoke the FFDCA's advertising and labeling provisions, which the agency uses to protect
consumers by requiring that drug promotional materials present
a balanced view of effectiveness claims and risk informationY3' As the CEO of a medical device company has noted, a
primary effect of IND/PLA regulations is to impose a "truth in
advertising" mandate upon the medical products industry. 2
In addition, the FDA has just begun to consider the problems
posed by Internet advertisements.' A considerable amount of
misleading and erroneous information about medical products is
available on World Wide Web pages, and cord blood is no exception. IND regulations prohibit advertisements of the safety
and effectiveness of an experimental drug, but safety and effectiveness data are often available on the Internet in the form of
communications between researchers, or in information provided
by a company to shareholders.' Such information is also accessible to patients, and can become distorted as preliminary
findings are disseminated among patient advocacy
newsgroups. 5 Although the FDA is concerned by marketing
efforts directed at the public via web pages,"6 the agency can
only influence the content of advertising for the products that it
regulates.

230. United States Cryobanks of Florida, Umbilical Cord Blood-Frequently Asked
Questions (last modified Jan. 3, 1996) <http-//www.uscryo-cord.comnumbilfaq.html>.
231. See discussion supra Parts H.D.1-3.
232. See Letter from Philip H. Coelho, President and CEO, ThermoGenesis Corp.,
to the FDA 1 (July 1, 1996) (on file with the FDA).
233. See Peter S. Reichertz, Legal Issues Concerning the Promotion of Pharmaceutical Products on the Internet to Consumers, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 355, 356-61 (1996).
234. See Promotion of FDA-Regulated Medical Products on the Internet; Notice of
Public Meeting, 61 Fed. Reg. 48,707-09 (1996).
235. See id.
236. See id.
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C. "Back Door" Regulating and the Reach of the FFDCA
In briefs submitted during the public comment period for the
first draft document on cord blood, 7 some industry officials
objected that the FDA was exceeding its regulatory mandate.' These industry documents raised both substantive and
procedural issues under administrative law. Chief among the
procedural objections is the claim that the FDA, by labeling its
document a draft document, while at the same time inviting the
submission of INDs for clinical trials, is "threatening" the industry into compliance while evading the more complex process
of rulemaking. 9
Rulemaking, including a period of "notice and comment," is
required under section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure
Act whenever an agency creates substantive rules, as opposed
to issuing statements of policy.'
Notice and comment
rulemaking requires economic and cost-benefit analyses," paperwork reduction analyses, 2 analyses of the impact of the
proposed regulation on small businesses,' and, with the passage of the Congressional Review Act of 1996, imposes delays
caused by mandatory Congressional review of most new FDA
rules.'
The FDA describes a draft document as an "informal communication."" 5 Such a document sets out, in the "best judgment
of FDA employees at this time," the agency's proposed approach
237. The public comment period was extended for three months at industry request.
238. See Letter (Petition for Stay of Administrative Action) from Kathleen M.
Sanzo, Morgan Lewis & Bockius, to the FDA 28 (June 6, 1996) (on file with the
FDA).
239. See id.
240. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1994).
241. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (193), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
601 (1994) (requiring cost-benefit analyses of regulatory alternatives).
242. See Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 13 U.S.C. § 91; 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-20
(Supp. I 1995).
243. See Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12 (1994).
244. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 801(a)(3) (1994). For a full discussion of the impact of this legislation, see generally James T. OReilly, FDA Rulemaking After the 104th Congress:
Major Rules Enter the Twilight Zone of Review, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 677 (1977).
245. See Food and Drug Administration regulations, guidelines, recommendations,
and agreements, 21 C.F.R. §10.90(b)(9) (1997).
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to regulation of a new product.'

Informal communications

under the Code of Federal Regulations are not binding on the
agency, nor do they necessarily represent what will be the content of a formally proposed rule. 47 The stated purpose of the
cord blood draft documents is to elicit comments during the
development of a proposed rule. One ancillary purpose, however, may be to dampen rampant commercialization of cord blood
services by placing entrepreneurs on notice that the agency
intends to assert some form of regulatory oversight.
The principal substantive legal objection to the FDA proposal
is the argument that the agency cannot justifiably require an
IND for cord blood.' The author of one industry brief asserts
that cord blood collection cannot be considered a clinical investigation under the IND regulations of the FFDCA, because no
drug is being "administered or dispensed," and no "clinical investigators" are involved. 9 Resolution of this point turns on
the extent of the FDA's latitude to define the category of experimental new drugs. If cord blood can validly be considered a
new drug, then IND regulations are consistent with this classification.
Although the FDA cannot classify products in an "arbitrary
and capricious" manner without violating the Administrative
Procedure Act, 0 precedent suggests that the agency has
broad discretion to define new products as regulable drugs,
devices, or biologics." The actual limits of the agency's discretion will likely be clarified by litigation over the FDA's new
tobacco advertising regulations, as the tobacco industry challenges the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction over cigarettes as
medical devices. 2

246. See CORD BLOOD DRAFT DOCUMENT, supra note 15, at 1.
247. Whether or not a communication issued as a draft document under 21 C.F.R.
10.90(bX9) represents a thinly-veiled attempt to impose binding rules is an issue
beyond the scope of this paper.
248. See generally Public Comments submitted to the FDA, supra note 16.
249. Letter from Sanzo, supra note 238, at 28-29 (citing Investigational New Drug
Application: Definitions and Interpretations, 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b) (1997)).
250. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1994).
251. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
252. See FDA Tobacco Regulations, supra note 66.
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V. THE HUMAN TISSUES SAFETY ACT OF 1996 (TISSUE ACT)
This bill, sponsored by Senator Wyden of Oregon and cosponsored by Senators Dodd and Simon, would preempt FDA regulation of cord blood and human tissues.25 The bill revokes the
FDA's proposed regulations for the transplantation of
tissues,5 substituting only minimal requirements to govern
tissue facility registration, operation, and advertising." Specifically exempted from the bill are organs, gene therapy, and
blood products, thus preserving existing regulatory oversight in
these areas. But in a seemingly inconsistent provision of the
bill, cord blood is singled out and expressly defined as a tissue,
the use of which is broadly deregulated." s
The Tissue Act defines human tissue, and cord blood, as a
"collection of similar human cells" that is "intended for use in
the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of a
disease of condition in a human or for reproduction" and that
"achieves its primary intended purpose through repair or replacement of bodily tissue through structural support or cellular
function."5 ' According to the bill's text, the FDA may not reclassify human tissue as a drug, a biologic, or a medical device,
(thereby subjecting tissues to a regulatory scheme) unless the
following conditions are met: (1) users of the tissue in question
have been required to collect retrospective data or to maintain
a patient registry for at least five years; and (2) "insufficient
data exist to confirm the safety and clinical benefit from the
use of such tissue."25 Alternatively, reclassification may occur
if use of the particular tissue product presents an "immediate
hazard to public health." 9 The registry requirement that is a
prerequisite to reclassification of a tissue may only be imposed

253. See S. 2195, 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter Tissue Act]. The legislation, entitled "A Bill to Provide to for the Regulation of Human Tissue for Transplantation to
Ensure That Such Tissue is Handled in a Manner to Preserve its Safety and Purity,"
was introduced in the Senate on October 3, 1996. The bill was subsequently referred
to Committee on Labor and Human Resources.
254. See CELLULAR & TISSUE BASED PRODUCTS, supra note 20.

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See
See
See
See
See

Tissue Act, supra note 253, at § 352A
id. at § 352A(i).
id. at §§ 1(a)(hh)(1)(A)-(B).
id. at § 352A(f)(1)(A).
id. at § 352A(f)(1)(B).

19981

CORD BLOOD REGULATION

453

once the FDA has engaged in the lengthy process of notice and
public comment.2"
As he introduced the bill, Senator Wyden offered the following rationale for legislative intervention: historically, the use of
allogenic (donor) tissue has not been subject to premarket approval; therefore, it makes no sense to subject autologous (a
patient's own) tissue to heightened regulation.2"' Wyden also
opined that the FDA's premarket approval process was designed
only for "synthetic" compounds with unpredictable effects. 2
In his comments on the Senate floor, Senator Wyden concluded:
This bill also recognizes that human cells and tissues are
not drugs, biological products, or medical devices, and that
it is inappropriate to regulate them as if they were. Drugs
may be toxic or carcinogenic, while tissue is not. Drugs
circulate in the bloodstream and have systemic effects,
while tissue is typically transplanted into a localized area
and does not circulate in the blood. For these, and many
other reasons, tissue is generally less risky than the products that FDA traditionally regulates.2"
Such sweeping generalizations about the safety of tissue
transplantation seem at best misguided, particularly with respect to novel tissue manipulation and transplantation procedures for which few clinical data, and virtually no long-term
outcome data, exist. The fact that bone marrow transplantation
predated comprehensive FDA regulation of tissues is a red
herring with little relevance to the question of whether novel
techniques such as cord blood transplantation should be exempted from regulatory oversight.
Nor is it correct to assume, as do the supporters of the Tissue Act, that tissue transplantation is inherently less risky
than the administration of a drug. Blood "tissues" in particular
may produce lethal immunological reactions when transplanted.
Blood tissues may also be "carcinogenic," in the sense that the
transplantation of blood stem cells carries the risk of transmit-

260. See id.
261. See 142 CONG. REC. 512309 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Wyden).
262. See id.
263. Id.
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ting genetic predispositions to cancer, in addition to the direct
transmission of infectious disease. Furthermore, these risks may
be higher-and not lower as Senator Wyden's comments imply-if a cancer patient's autologous cord blood is used for
transplantation.
Risks of cancer and toxicity do not arise solely from products
that "circulate within the blood," as the Tissue Act seems to imply. In the case of stem cell transplantation, this systemic/nonsystemic distinction is meaningless; stem cells must migrate through the bloodstream to their ultimate transplantation
"site," the bone marrow.2" Once engrafted, stem cells discharge their progeny, blood cells, directly into the circulatory
system. Thus, even if organs and cartilage could be distinguished from drugs because the former are tissues "transplanted into a localized area,"2" this distinction would still not provide a basis for excluding cord blood transplantation from the
FDA's IND regulations.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The federal government has not been slow to appreciate the
potential of placental and umbilical cord blood transplantation.
As Paul Coelho, president and CEO of Thermogenesis (a medical device company) noted in his comments on the first draft
proposal for the regulation of cord blood, "the FDA has moved
very rapidly to assist the development of this therapy in the
United States, the only country where a comprehensive cord
blood program is already in place (supported by NIH funding),
is already saving lives, and soon may be generally available to
all patients."2" The NIH-funded network of public cord blood
banks represents a large scale government investment, more
than thirty million dollars, in cord blood research and development."' Through this public banking network, allogenic trans-

264. See CELLULAR & TISSUE-BASED PRODUCTS, supra note 20, at Part V.B(2)(d).
Hematopoietic stem cells have a metabolic (systemic) mode of action, and the failure

or improper functioning of such cells can create adverse, life-threatening systemic
events. See id.
265. Statement of Senator Wyden, supra note 261.
266. Letter from Coelho, supra note 232, at 1.
267. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 13.
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plantation will be available to a far wider number of patients
than those few who can afford, or might ever face the need, to
store their infant's blood privately.
In the interests of sound science and consumer protection,
the FDA should reaffirm its initial decision to treat cord blood
as an investigatory new drug, subject to a period of clinical
development. The NHLBI, sponsor of this public system, supports the FDA's proposed IND regulation of cord blood and is
fully prepared to comply with IND requirements. NHLBI Director Claude Lenfant emphasizes that the IND mechanism "is
wholly consistent with conducting responsible research
....
"268 Lenfant adds: "Since research in general operates
with protocols, data collection, and data analysis, an IND requirement will neither impose an undue burden nor constitute
an inhibitory influence on research."269
The FDA's partial retreat from an initial position that commercialization should follow science in cord blood transplantation is troubling. The agency's revised plan to exempt autologous uses of cord blood from an IND seems illogical, given that
autologous uses have been the subject of far less research than
allogenic uses. Furthermore, most of the unresolved questions
about safe collection, storage, and transplantation protocols
apply equally to all procedures involving cord blood, regardless
of the identity of the transplant recipient.
Nonetheless, a watered-down version of IND regulation is
still preferable to legislation such as the Tissue Act. Even those
who disfavor the imposition of any premarket approval requirements generally agree that cord blood deserves a level of oversight consistent with the FDA's recently-heightened regulation
of blood donation facilities.270 Yet, by effectively removing cord
blood from FDA jurisdiction pending a public health crisis, the
Tissue Act legislation is a far more drastically deregulatory
approach than even the one favored by the cord blood industry.

268. Letter from Lenfant, supra note 41, at 1.
269. Id.

270. These regulations include establishment licensure (ELAs), requirements to
adhere to good manufacturing practice guidelines (GMPs), FDA inspection and sanctions for non-compliance, and mandatory patient tracking and data reporting. See
supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
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Essentially, under the Tissue Act, the resolution of all outstanding issues in cord blood transplantation-from privacy and
consent to appropriate manufacturing protocols-would be left
to the vagaries of the private market. Consumers are ill-served
by this type of "regulatory reform," in which legislators substitute their own judgment for that of scientific experts and the
public health is staked on a roll of the free market dice.27'

271. Subsequent to the completion of this article, the Working Group on Ethical
Issues in Umbilical Cord Blood Banking published a consensus statement in the Journal of the American Medical Association. See Jeremy Sugarman et al., Ethical Issues
in Umbilical Cord Blood Banking, 278 JAMA 938 (1997). The multidisciplinary group
of experts in blood banking, bone marrow transplantation, obstetrics, ethics, law, and
social sciences concluded that, given the uncertain and exploratory nature of the science of umbilical stem cell (UBC) transplantation, "UBC banking and use ought to be
considered an investigational technology rather than a proven treatment." Id. at 942.
The group expressed reservations about the FDA's modified regulatory proposals and
cautioned further that "[b]ecause of the current paucity of scientific data to support
the future use of autologous stem cells," stem cell banking for autologous uses is at
best "speculative." Id. The group noted that current marketing of commercial UBC
services is characterized by statements that tend to mislead parents about the necessity or utility of UBC banking. See id. at 242-43.

